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INTRODUCTION

HISTORICALLY, BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS, in administering trust funds for widows, orphans, and a variety of spendthrifts, made trust investments which were restricted by statute to
bonds, real estate mortgages, and United States Treasury obligations.1
However, after World War II and with the passage in many states
of "prudent man" statutes, common stocks gained respectability and
consequently found their way into trust portfolios.' Bank trustees,
once mere administrators of funds, became investment managers who
were judged in the minds of many by their investment performance
and subjected to pressure for better than average returns. In addition
to performing their traditional roles as trustees and executors, bank
trustees have expanded their activities to the extent that they now
serve as investment advisors to investment companies, employee benefit plans, individuals, and institutions, and offer a wide variety of other
investment and operational services. 3 The asset base of trust departt Executive Vice President, Girard Bank, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.S.,
Temple University.
t" Senior Trust Officer, Girard Bank, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Member, New
York and Pennsylvania Bars. B.A., Georgetown University; LL.B., St. John's
University.
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Gerard W. Farrell in the
preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., Act of July 2, 1935, No. 206, §§ 1 et seq., [1935] Pa. Laws 545
(repealed 1972).
2. See Church & Seidel, The Changing Scene in Personal Trust Departments,
113 TRUSTS & ESTATES 370 (1974). For an example of a state statute allowing a
trustee to purchase common stock, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7302(b) (1975). For
an explanation of the "prudent man" rule, see note 6 and accompanying text infra.
3. See, e.g.,

GIRARD BANK,

1974

TRUST DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT 3

(1975).

(367)
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ments has expanded to the point where 3,804 commercial bank trust
departments now care for over $400 billion in customer funds.'
Initially, the chief restraint upon a trust department in exercising
its investment responsibilities was the duty it owed to the trust beneficiaries as a trustee.' Bank trustees followed the "prudent man" rule
which merely required a trustee to make such investments as a prudent
man would make in dealing with his own property, primarily with a
view toward preserving the estate and producing a regular income.6
However, the recent and dramatic growth of insider liability
under the federal securities laws has placed another restraint upon
commercial bank trust departments which has presented bank officers
with conflicting duties to trust beneficiaries, corporate borrowers, and
the investing public, and which could well alter the structure of our
capital markets. This article will analyze this dilemma presently faced
by commercial banks and will review the alternative solutions which
commentators and practitioners have developed to resolve it.
II.

BACKGROUND -

INSIDER LIABILITY UNDER RULE

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934

Act), 7

lOb-5

in conjunc-

tion with the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)," was designed to
prevent fraud and unfairness in the public securities marketf Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act'0 generally forbids the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.""
In 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, Commission) promulgated rule lOb-512 which generally made unlawful
certain forms of fraudulent or deceptive conduct, including an omission to state a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of
4. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION & COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, TRUST ASSETS OF INSURED
COMMERCIAL BANKS - 1974, at 5.

5. See generally G.G.

BoGERT

& G.T. BOGERT,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

§ 1 (5th ed. 1973).
6. See id. § 93, at 337; 3 A. ScOTT, TRUSTS § 227, at 1805-06 (3d ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as SCOTT]. This common law duty of bank trust departments has
also been the subject of legislation in many states. See, e.g., N.Y. EST., PowERs &
TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.2 (McKinney 1967). See also Bialkin, Banks and Investment
Managers as Institutional Investors, 89 BANKING L.J. 883, 895 (1972).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970).
8. Id. §§ 77a et seq.
9. See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5, §§ 3.01-.02, 10.01-.02 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as JACOBS].
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).
11. Id.
12. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
TRUSTS
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securities. 18 The rule had little practical effect, however, until the 1946
decision of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 4 In Kardon, a federal
district court held that although rule lb-5 did not explicitly create a
private cause of action for the violation of its provisions, an implied
private right of action did exist. 5 This principle has been wholeheartedly adopted by the federal courts,'" and imaginative plaintiffs
have since helped expand liability under rule lOb-5 to encompass a
7
broad range of defendants.'
While the purpose of rule 10b-5 is clear on its face, one commentator has delineated at least eight underlying policies for the
rule:
(1) maintaining free securities markets; (2) equalizing access
to information; (3) insuring equal bargaining strength; (4) providing for disclosure; (5) protecting investors; (6) assuring
fairness; (7) building investor confidence; and (8) deterring
violations while compensating victims.'"
Most of these policies are served by the rule's proscription of the
trading or recommending of securities on the basis of "material inside
information" by an "insider" or a "tippee" of an insider.' 9 To appre13. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
14. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
15. Id. at 513-14. The Kardon court based its decision on section 286 of the
Restatement of Torts, which provided that the violation of a statute by doing a
prohibited act renders the actor liable for the resulting injury to another if the intent
of the statute is to protect the injured party and the interest injured is the one sought
to be protected. Id., quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
16. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Hooper v. Mountain
State Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961);
Froth v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). See generally 1 A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 2.4(1) (1974)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
17. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (bank
officers) ; SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (lawyers) ; Brennan
v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970) (regional stock exchange) ; Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(corporate officers and directors).
18. JAcoBs, supra note 9, § 6.01, at 1-113.
19. The General Counsel of the SEC has stated that "[a] major Commission
objective is to eliminate the use of material nonpublic inside information in securities
transactions." Cook, The SEC and Banks, 89 BANKING L.J. 499, 508 (1972).
For a definition of the term "insider" and its application to bank trust departments, see notes 31-38 and accompanying text infra. For an explanation of the term
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ciate the scope of rule IOb-5 as it affects bank trustees, an understanding of what is meant by "material inside information" is required.
"Inside information" has been judicially defined as nonpublic
information 0 concerning the business of the issuer, 21 one of its securities,22 or the market for its securities, 2 which is intended to be available only for corporate purposes and not for any individual's personal
benefit.

24

The determination of what information is "material" involves
a more complicated inquiry since several closely related objective and
subjective definitions have been developed. Three principal objective
tests for materiality have been formulated. The first is based upon
the judgment of a reasonable investor or a reasonable stockholder; if
the pertinent information would affect a reasonable investor in making
an investment decision, it is deemed material. 2 A second objective
test that has been developed is the "probability test," which is used
"tippee" and its relevance to the possible liability of bank trust departments under
rule 10b-5, see note 34 infra.
20. "Nonpublic" has been interpreted by the courts to mean unavailable to the
investing public. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). "Nonpublic facts" include intentions, promises,
opinions, predictions, recommendations, estimates, and projections which are unavailable to the investing public. See JACOBS, supra note 9, § 66.02(b).
21. See, e.g., Childs v. RIC Group, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1078, 1083 (N.D. Ga. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 447 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1971).
22. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8713 (October 7, 1969).
23. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
24. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). Some authorities
question whether the corporate purpose requirement is an absolute one for inside
information since this classification would not encompass all of the information that
can be obtained by an insider. For example, a director of a company could request
and obtain a field report about an ore strike for his or her own personal investment
purposes. Such information would not be considered inside information if the corporate purpose test is applied. See Sandler & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform
in the Securities Marketplace, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 225, 238-39 (1969).
25. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965). The category of "reasonable investor" also includes speculators
and chartists. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
While this particular objective test has been widely utilized by the courts,
they have differed as to the degree to which the investor must have been affected by
the information. Some courts have concluded that the standard is whether the investor
"might" or "would" have been affected. E.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., supra at 463.
Another formulation of this objective test is based upon whether the information
"might have had a significant propensity" to affect the investor. Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (standard under SEC rule 14a-9). These
standards are analyzed in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544, 569-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The United States Supreme Court appears to have
settled the question by opting for a broad standard. The Court stated that a material
fact is one which "a reasonable investor might have considered . . . important in the
making of [his or her] decision." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 153-54 (1972) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This view has subsequently been followed by several lower federal courts. See, e.g., SEC v. Koenig,
469 F.2d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1972).
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when it is necessary to measure the materiality of some event which
has yet to occur. 26 The Second Circuit has framed this test as follows:
[W]hether facts are material within Rule lOb-5 when the facts
relate to a particular event and are undisclosed by 'those persons
who are knowledgeable thereof will depend at any given time upon
a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will
occur and
the anticipated magnitude of the totality of the company
27
activity.
The third objective test defines materiality in terms of the extent of
the anticipated change in the market price of the issuer's securities
resulting from the publication of the inside information; under this
standard, a fact is material if its disclosure could reasonably and objectively have a substantial impact upon the price of the issuer's
securities. 8
In addition to these objective tests, a subjective criterion has been
formulated: materiality measured by the importance which the defendants themselves have accorded the undisclosed information.2" It should
be noted, however, that the courts which have employed the subjective
test in determining that a fact is material have not done so without
finding that at least one of the objective tests had also been satisfied."
III.

BANK LIABILITY

Initially, bank trustees appeared far removed from the pale of
insider liability under rule lOb-5 since only officers, directors, and
employees of the corporation whose securities were involved were considered insiders. 8 ' However, the definition of insider has been expanded
26. See generally

JACOBS,

supra note 9, § 61.02(b) (ii).

27. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). An example of a situation calling for the use of this
test would be when, on the basis of one test drill, an ore company learns of an ore
strike but is not presently able to determine its size. The probability of a successful
ore strike and its magnitude would have to be evaluated in light of the size of the
company itself in order to determine if an ore strike of the projected size would be
commercially significant.
28. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963). The market
impact of the material information would be measured by the ratio of the change in
price resulting from disclosure of the information to the price immediately before the
disclosure. See JACOBS, supra note 9, § 61.02(b) (ii).
29. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Under this test, materiality is inferred from the fact
that the insider traded upon the basis of the inside information. See 2 BROMBERG, supra
note 16, § 7.4(3) (h). A possible defense under this test would be for the defendant
to show that the motivation was a result of some factor other than the inside information in question. Id.; see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra at 851.
30. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. den~ied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ; Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
31. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961).
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by recent case law to the extent that it may now include a bank trustee.
The expansion was initiated in Cady, Roberts & Co.,82 an SEC decision
in which the Commission expressly refused to limit the prohibition of
insider trading to those traditionally considered insiders. In Cady,
Roberts, the Commission held that a broker-dealer violated rule 10b-5
by trading on the basis of corporate inside information received from
a representative of the brokerage firm who also served on the corporation's board. 83 The Commission stated that the prohibition of rule
lOb-5 could be applied to any person and that its application depended
only upon the existence of a relationship giving a person access to
information which was intended solely for a nonpublic corporate
8 4

purpose.

This expanded concept of insider liability was firmly endorsed by
the Second Circuit in the landmark case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. 3 ' That case involved officers and directors who, on the basis of
inside information concerning an extremely valuable ore strike made
by the corporation, traded in their own corporation's stock and tipped
relatives and friends who likewise traded." The court, in finding the
officers and directors liable,8 7 stated:
32. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
33. Id. at 908-11. The inside information was that the dividend rate of the
particular corporation's securities had been reduced by its board of directors. Id. at 909.
34. Id. at 912. The SEC and the federal courts have divided the category of
persons liable for trading on inside information into "insiders" and "tippees." See,
e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). An insider is an individual who receives material
inside information through a business relationship with the issuer. See List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
Examples of an insider are: the director of the issuing corporation, a broker dealing
in the corporation's stock, and a banker making a loan to the corporation. A tippee
is one who receives the information through some channel other than a business relationship. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). An example
of a tippee would be the wife of a corporate director who receives information from
her husband who is an insider.
The reason for distinguishing between insiders and tippees is important in
determining the liability of the person who gives the information to the insider or
the tippee. The insider's informant is not liable for the insider's misuse of the business information since that information was merely relayed to a person who was
entitled to receive it. JAcoBs, supra note 9, § 66.02(a). However, the tippee's
confidant is liable for the tippee's subsequent actions. See Ross v. Licht, supra at 411.
Because this article is concerned only with the possible liability of a commercial bank due to the special relationship between its trust department and its
commercial department, and because the liability and restrictions placed upon an
insider and a tippee are identical, see Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464
F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1972), the ramifications of the tippee-insider distinction in relation to the liability of their informants will not be pursued further. For a detailed
explanation of the liability of an informant, or "tipper," see JAcoBs, supra note 9,
§§ 162-68.
35. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
36. 401 F.2d at 843-47.
37. The tippees of the defendants were not involved in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
proceeding, and the court expressly refused to consider whether they were in violation
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[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses
not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities 8 concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed. 8
In a recent case, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.," the Second Circuit applied rule lOb-5 to a factual situation analogous to that of a commercial bank. In Shapiro, a brokerage
firm received adverse inside information concerning Douglas Aircraft
Company (Douglas) while serving as a managing underwriter for a
large public offering of Douglas securities.40 While the brokerage
firm refrained from trading in Douglas securities itself, in its role as an
investment advisor it passed on the adverse information to its customers
who then sold their Douglas stock.4 ' Plaintiffs, who had purchased
on the open market at the time the brokerage firm passed on the inside
information, brought suit against the brokerage firm, 42 seeking damages
under rule lOb-5.4 5 The Second Circuit held that the brokerage firm
had violated rule lOb-5 by transmitting the material inside information
44
to its customers.
While no court has yet held a bank liable for a violation of rule
lOb-5 when its trust department trades upon information acquired
by the bank, it would require no great extension of the previously discussed case law to support such a holding.45 For example, in making
of rule 10b-5. Id. at 852-53. However, the court noted that the tippee's conduct
"certainly could be [as] equally reprehensible" as that of the named defendant. Id.
38. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
39. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 231-32. The material inside information in Shapiro was that Douglas
had recorded substantially lower profits in 1966 than it had projected and that it had
lowered its profit projections for 1967. This information was not made public until
after the defendants' claimed activities had occurred. Id.
41. Id. at 232.
42. Id. at 234. The customers of the brokerage house who had utilized the information in their trading activities were also held liable. Id. at 232-34.
43. Id. at 232-33.
44. Id. at 236-41. The Second Circuit specifically based its decision upon its
prior holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Id. at 236. The defendants argued that Texas
Gulf Sulphur was inapplicable because it had involved an SEC injunctive proceeding
rather than a private suit for damages as in Shapiro. Id. The Shapiro court rejected
this argument on the grounds that public policy required the same finding of liability,
regardless of whether an SEC injunction or a private action was involved. Id. The defendants further argued that even if they had violated rule lOb-5, they were not liable
to the plaintiffs since they had not caused the plaintiffs' injuries. Id. at 238. However,
the Second Circuit concluded that the required causation was supplied by "the uncontroverted facts that the [defendant] . .. recommended trading in Douglas stock without disclosing material inside information which plaintiffs as reasonable investors might
have considered important in making their decision to purchase Douglas stock." Id.
45. The author has discovered no case in which a bank trust department was
found liable in such circumstances. But see Local 734 Bakery Drivers Pension Fund
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a credit analysis of a potential corporate borrower, the commercial
department of a bank often receives comprehensive financial and related
information concerning that borrower.4 6 In fact, the commercial department has a duty to gather all pertinent information in making its
credit analysis. 4" Although in many cases the available information
contains no more than any astute credit analyst could obtain,48 it is
clear that the lender-borrower relationship could give rise to a situation where the bank would receive information deemed "inside" as
defined by the courts. Furthermore, since the information is generally
received in the context of a confidential business relationship, the
commercial department is an insider within the proscriptive realm of
10b-5.49 However, the commercial department, as a separate entity,
is not in a precarious position with respect to rule 10b-5 since that
department usually does not trade in public securities, and consequently
would not be in a position to so utilize the inside information.5" However, the trust department of a bank is in an entirely different position.
In its role as a trustee, the trust department actively trades a large
number of public securities daily, and in its role as advisor, makes
recommendations concerning securities which its customers may
utilize." Therefore, if the various departments of a bank are considered to be only parts of a single entity, and the commercial department receives inside information which it actually or constructively5 2
transmits -to the trust department, and the trust department utilizes
the information in its trading activities, the bank could be considered to
have traded on inside information and thus be subject to liability under
rule 10b-5.
Trust v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH

ir

L. REP. 94,565 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (claim under rule 10b-5 survived motion
to dismiss) ; notes 69 and accompanying text infra.
FED. SEC.

46. See E. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPART73 (1975); 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT 2716 (1971).
47. See Yellon, Trust Investments: Problems Regarding Exchange of Information between the Trust Department and other Departments within the Bank, 54 CHI.
B. RECORD 405, 408 (1973). Mr. Yellon compares this duty of the trust department to
the "due diligence" standard required of a managing underwriter in a public issue
of securities. Id.
48. An investor has no obligation to confer upon other investors the benefit of a
superior financial or other expert analysis. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
49. See note 34 supra.
50. However, the commercial department is in a position to be a tipper, and
thus potentially liable for any subsequent illegal actions by the tippee. Id.
51. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
52. See text accompanying notes 104-12 infra.
MENTS
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THE CONFLICTING DUTIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS

The application of rule lOb-5 to a bank's commercial and trust
activities presents the bank with a serious dilemma arising from the
existence of conflicting duties. First, through its commercial department, the bank owes a duty to its commercial loan customers not to
publicly disclose any information received in confidence as a result of
any loan or business transaction. 3 Secondly, through the trust department, the bank owes a duty to its trust beneficiaries to utilize all
of its power to further the interest of the beneficiaries to the exclusion
of all self-interests and interests of !third parties.5 4 This duty would
appear to require the bank to utilize all of the available relevant investment information, including the inside information received by the
commercial department.55 Finally, by virtue of the expansive reading
that has been given to rule lOb-5 by the courts, when trading in public
securities the bank has a duty to the investing public to either refrain
from trading on the inside information or to disclose that information
to the public before trading.56 Thus, when in the course of loan negotiations with a corporation a bank obtains material inside information
about that corporation, or any other corporation, it is faced with a
serious predicament. The bank's obligation to the commercial loan
customer would require it to keep the information confidential, while
its duty to the trust beneficiaries would require it to utilize the information in deciding whether to purchase or dispose of the stock for the
trust accounts. Further, its responsibility to the investing public under
rule lOb-5 would require the bank to either publicly disclose the inside
information (which would defy its duty to the commercial loan
customer) or refrain from trading in the commercial loan customer's
securities for its trust accounts (which would defy its obligation to the
trust beneficiaries). Finally, to compound the problem, it can be argued
53. See Schuyler, From Sulphur to Surcharge? - Corporate Trustee Exposure
Under SEC Rule 1~b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 42, 51-52 (1972) ; cf. Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (duty of a managing underwriter to an issuer).

54. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 453, at
473-74 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BOGFRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES] ; 2 SCOTT,
supra note 6, § 170, at 1298.
55. Prior to the advent of rule lOb-5, trust law required that all the special
skills and knowledge of the trustee be placed at the disposal of the beneficiary, and
the courts considered the gathering of information from "insiders" as evidence of the

trustees' care and prudence. See In re Clark's Will, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397
(1931) ; In re Pate's Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd mem., 276 App.
Div. 1008, 95 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1950), motion for leave to appeal denied, 301 N.Y. 814
(1950); cf. In re McCafferty, 147 Misc. 179, 264 N.Y.S. 38 (Sur. Ct. 1933).

56. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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that the bank may expose itself to liability merely by placing itself
in a situation where it is subject to these conflicting duties. 7
The inevitable consequence of the existence of these three opposing
obligations is that, if the bank is considered a single entity, it may be
simultaneously liable to a number of plaintiffs regardless of which
course of action it chooses. First, if the trust department trades upon
the material inside information, or merely trades after the receipt of
information by the commercial department in a manner consistent
with the information, 8 the SEC or the Department of Justice might
initiate an action against the bank which could include civil injunctions5" or fines and criminal sentences. 60
A second potential plaintiff would be an investor who purchased
or sold stock over a national securities exchange at the time the trust
department was trading on the inside information. 1 This could expose
the bank to staggering liability in a situation where the security is
62
widely traded.
A third possible plaintiff is the beneficiary of a trust managed by
the bank trustee. The beneficiary would presumably sue the bank for
breaching its common law duty as a fiduciary for failing to utilize the
inside information available to it to protect the beneficiary's interest.
As previously mentioned, the traditional fiduciary concept in trust law
requires a trustee to administrate a trust solely in the interests of the
beneficiaries, and also requires the trustee to exclude any self-interest
57. Cf. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr.
157 (Ct. App. 1968); Albright v. Jefferson County Nat'l Bank, 292 N.Y. 31, 53
N.E.2d 753 (1944).
58. The SEC, in reviewing the analogous situation in which a brokerage firm
received inside information in its role as underwriter and then traded consistently with
that information, stated:
[W]e would view as suspect and subject to close scrutiny a defense that there
was no internal communication of material non-public information and its source
by a member of a broker-dealer firm or other investment organization who
received it, where a transaction of the kind indicated by it was effected by his
organization immediately or closely thereafter. A showing of such receipt and
transaction prior to the time the information became public should in itself constitute strong evidence of knowledge by the one who effected the transaction
and by the firm.
Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 647 n.28 (1971).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Commission sought
to enjoin the defendants from trading on inside information, and to have the prohibited
securities transactions rescinded. 401 F.2d at 839.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 7 8ff(a) (1970) (fines up to $10,000 and imprisonment up to
2 years); see, e.g., United States v. Guterma, 281 F.2d 742 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 871 (1960).
61. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
62. A number of courts and commentators have noted the enormous potential
liability involved in such an action under rule lOb-5. E.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 242 (2d Cir. 1974); Schuyler, supra
note 53, at 48-49 & n.35.
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or interest of third parties.63 It is arguable that this traditional fiduciary duty would require the bank trustee in managing its beneficiaries'
accounts to ignore the interests of the investing public protected by rule
10b-5. However, under traditional trust law, a trustee has no duty to
violate the law in administrating a trust. 64 In response to a contention
that a stock broker had a fiduciary duty to customers to trade upon
inside information, the SEC has stated:
[W]hile [the stock broker] undoubtedly occupied a fiduciary
relationship to his customers, this fiduciary relationship could not
justify any actions by him contrary to the law. Even if we assume
the existence of conflicting fiduciary obligations, there can be no
doubt which is primary here. On these facts, clients may not
expect of a broker the benefits5 of his inside information at the
expense of the public generally.
One commentator has suggested, however, that the less flexible relationship between a bank trustee and the beneficiary should give rise
to a higher level of fiduciary duty to the beneficiary than the duty
existing in a broker-client relationship.66 In light of the fact that a
trustee has no duty to violate the law in administrating a trust, it
seems unlikely that even a higher bank trustee-beneficiary relationship
would require the bank to violate rule lOb-5.
A further problem may arise for the bank if the bank trustee
erroneously decides that certain inside information is material and
refrains from trading in certain securities for its trust accounts. In
Investors Management Co., 67 the SEC stated that if the belief that the
information was material was reasonable, the trustee's inaction would
not be held improper. However, since this statement by the SEC may
be discounted as dicta by a regulatory agency concerned only with
enforcing the federal securities laws, 68 it can afford no great comfort
to a bank trust officer concerned with avoiding liability under the
state trust laws when deciding whether to abstain from trading in a
particular security.
A trust department may also be sued by a beneficiary for failing
to disclose to the beneficiary that it possesses adverse material inside
63. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
64. 2 ScoTT, supra note 6, § 166.
65. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961); accord, Investors Mgmt

Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
66. Schuyler, supra note 53, at 47.

67. 44 S.E.C. 633, 647 (1971).
68. Id. at 634. Investors Management Co. involved the failure of a brokerage
firm to disclose a reduction in an issuer's earnings. Id. As such, there was no issue
as to a trustee's erroneous belief that inside information was material.
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information about a corporation whose securities it is purchasing for
the beneficiary's account and for failing to disclose to the beneficiary
that it may be prohibited from trading upon that information because
of its position as an insider. At least one court has held that these
circumstances give rise to a cause of action under rule lOb-5.6" These
theories of liability differ from the usual beneficiary suit at common
law, where the claim is that the fiduciary violated a common law duty
to the beneficiary to protect the latter's assets.7 °
The disclosure aspect involves yet another potential plaintiff: the
corporate loan recipient. If, in order to avoid liability under rule 10b-5,
a bank discloses information which was given to it in confidence by
a corporate borrower, the corporate customer could bring suit against
the bank for breach of fiduciary duty and recover for any damage
suffered. 7' The potential liability of the bank in this context is substantial. For example, a corporation could make a valuable ore find
and attempt to purchase options on all nearby land; if the bank publicly
disclosed the information prior to the corporation's acquisition of all
the options, the option prices would rise dramatically and the bank
could be held liable for this price differential.
69. Local 734 Bakery Drivers Pension Fund Trust v. Continental Ill. Bank &
Trust Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 94,565 (N.D. Ill.
1974). In Bakery Drivers, five cases brought by various trust beneficiaries against a
commercial bank were consolidated for the purposes of discovery. Id. at 95,958.
There were two claims central to each of the consolidated cases. First, the beneficiaries
claimed that the bank failed to disclose detailed inside information about Penn
Central, whose stock the bank had acquired for the beneficiaries' account at a time
when the bank made substantial loans to Penn Central. The inside information was
that Penn Central had "insufficient cash, substantial and accelerating operating losses,
debt service requirements in excess of cash generated, and inflated market price."
Id. at 95,961. Second, the beneficiaries claimed that the bank had failed to disclose to
the beneficiaries that the bank had a conflict of interest and that it might be prohibited
as an insider from trading in Penn Central stock. Id. at 95,956. The federal district
court held that these grounds formed a cause of action under rule 10b-5, denying the
banks motion to dismiss for, inter alia, the failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted and the lack of the beneficiaries' standing to sue. Id. at 95,962.
It is important to note that in holding that the beneficiaries had standing to
sue the bank under rule lOb-5, the Bakery Drivers court rejected the "purchaser or
seller" requirement of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Bakery Drivers court held that the class of
people with standing to sue under rule lob-5 was composed of the broader class of
"investors." [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. at 95,958-59.
However, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the
United States Supreme Court, in upholding the Birnbaum restriction, emphasized that
a private right of action for damages is confined to actual purchasers or sellers of
securities. 421 U.S. at 731-32. In light of Blue Chip Stamps, the standing of trust
beneficiaries to sue their trustees can no longer be based upon principles broader
than the standing requirements of Birnbaum.
70. 2 SCOTT, supra note 6, § 176.
71. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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V.

ALTERNATIVE

SOLUTIONS

Having recognized the inherent dilemma faced by commercial
banks with respect to their disposition of inside information, positive
measures must be taken to reduce or eliminate the conflicts with which
they are confronted. Due to the enormous potential liability involved,
there is a great possibility of harm to the investing public, to bank
depositors, and to corporations attempting to raise capital. Therefore,
the remainder of this article will consider various solutions to the
problems faced by commercial banks with regard to their treatment of
material inside information.
A.

Immunity from Rule 10b-5

From the bank's viewpoint the most effective solution to the
dilemma would be to confer upon them an immunity from rule lOb-5
liability when they trade on the basis of material inside information.
72
Such a proposal has been advanced by Professor David M. Schuyler.
Positing that a bank trustee in the typical inside information situation
has only two alternatives -

to trade or not to trade -

Professor

Schuyler questions the validity of imposing a non-trading requirement
since it would not necessarily operate to curtail the possibility of securities fraud.73 He argued that the trading of securities in the open
market by an insider, as opposed to a face-to-face transaction, is not
the cause of a public investor's subsequent loss, but rather the loss is
caused by the insider's nondisclosure.14 However, an insider who refrains from trading on inside information, even though failing to disclose such, is not held liable under rule lOb-5 since the insider has
not shown an indifference or disregard to the rights of other investors.75
Therefore, Professor Schuyler reasoned that it is unjust to impose
liability upon a bank trustee when it trades on inside information in
a public market if it demonstrates a regard for the rights of the investing public and if it is attempting to protect the interests of the trust's
beneficiaries "to whom [it] owes a higher duty of care than any which
[it] may have to an unknown open-market buyer."" 6
Professor Schuyler submitted that to avail itself of this limited
liability a trust department should be required to prove: 1) that the
loss suffered by the public investor was not caused by the bank trustee's
72. Schuyler, supra note 53, at 51-55.
73. Id. at 53.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 53-54.
76. Id. at 54. However, as previously noted, no court has yet held that the
trustee's duty to an open-market buyer is less stringent than that which the trustee
owes to the beneficiary. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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conduct; 2) that there was a total lack of reliance by the public investor
upon the bank trustee's trading activities; and 3) that the bank trustee's
activities were not perpetrated with a conscious disregard or indeference to the risk that public investors would be misled or sustain
losses.

77

Under this immunity theory, a bank trustee's problems with respect to rule lOb-5 would appear solved; as long as it acted without
conscious disregard for public investors, it could trade on the basis of
inside information free from any liability to the investing public or
disgruntled beneficiaries. However, it is submitted that this solution,
though attractive to banks, is unreasonable. First, it is highly doubtful
whether the SEC and the courts would accept the theory since it runs
directly counter to the disclosure policy of rule lOb-5.7 s Second, it
would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to meet the requirement of regard for the investing public, since any sale based upon
undisclosed inside information would seem to be inherently in disregard
of the risk of loss to the investing public. Third, according to the
theory, banks trading upon inside information could avoid liability
by superficial compliance with its requirements. Finally, the rule gives
a trust beneficiary the privilege of taking investment advantage of
inside information - a privilege denied to all other investors - simply
because a trust relationship is involved. It is submitted that in view
of the disclosure policy behind rule 10b-5, such a broad grant of im7
munity cannot be justified.
B.

Full Disclosure

Since it is unlikely that commercial banks will be immunized
from the operation of rule lOb-5, the next most effective solution
would appear to be to ensure the prompt public dissemination of all
material inside information. Disclosure could be achieved in two ways:
by banks voluntarily adopting a policy of encouraging corporate customers to disclose confidential information, or by legislation and administrative rules requiring either the banks or the corporate customers
to make such disclosures. 80 A bank policy of encouraging its corporate
customers to disclose would probably have little practical effect as
those customers would most certainly resist an attempt to make public
77. Schuyler, supra note 53, at 54.
78. See text accompanying note 18 supra.

79. Id.
80. See text accompanying notes 119-24 infra.
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any confidential corporate information." However, this policy could
conceivably reduce the bank's potential liability to the extent that it
indicates the bank's intent not to misuse the information.
On the other hand, requiring banks to disseminate to the public
all material inside information within a reasonable time period after
it is received would substantially reduce the risk of the information
being misused, although misuse could still occur between the time the
information is received and the time it is disseminated. If this disclosure requirement were imposed upon a bank, it would of necessity
take precedence over the duty of a bank to its corporate loan customers
not to disclose the confidential information given in order to obtain a
loan. However, the status of the duty of a bank to its trust beneficiaries
to gather and utilize all of the information for the benefit of its beneficiaries would remain uncertain. The trust department, as a part of
the single entity which includes the commercial department, might
still have access to the inside information prior to its public dissemination and therefore, could use it unlawfully in the course of its trading
activities.
A statutory requirement of public disclosure by corporations of
any material inside information they possess would eliminate the inside
information problem of banks under rule lOb-5. The weakness of this
mandatory disclosure approach is the assumption that the investing
public should have complete access to an issuer's confidential corporate
information. There are many instances when a corporate treasurer
must maintain a confidential relationship with a bank in order to
structure the details of the proposed plan which is the subject of
financing. 2 To disrupt such a relationship merely to avoid the potential
misuse of information by a bank trustee seems shortsighted. However, at the same time a more complete disclosure of non-confidential
information by banks and their corporate borrowers would reduce,
although not eliminate, any potential abuse by reducing the quantity
of inside information available for the 'bank trustee's exclusive use.8 3
81. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
82. For example, confidentiality is essential where a proposed corporate restructuring entails the sale of a profitable, partially owned subsidiary. If the plan or
its details were made public, the price of the stock of the subsidiary could become
distorted, thereby disrupting the delicate negotiations.
83. Bank trust departments have recently set about disclosing information about
their asset size and their policies with respect to such matters as trading and proxies.
See generally GIRARD BANK TRUST DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT (1974). Additionally, the SEC is now authorized to require the disclosure of certain portfolio
holdings and trading activities of banks and other large institutional investment
managers. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(f) (1975). Certain banks are already required to file
similar reports with the Comptroller of the Currency. 12 C.F.R. § 9.102 (1975).
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C. spin-offs
On its face, a complete spin-off of a bank's commercial and trust
activities would appear to be one of the simplest solutions to the insider
information problem of commercial banks.8 4 This concept gained favor
following a 1968 report issued by the Subcommittee on Domestic
Finance of the House Banking and Currency Committee dealing with
the concentration of economic power in commercial banks.8 5 While
the report primarily focused on the power that banks could exercise
over non-bank corporations,", the observations made are applicable to
the rule 10b-5 dilemma of commercial banks. If the banking and
trust departments of commercial banks were completely separated and
rendered independent entities, the potential flow of information would
be eliminated. Although each would still be subject to liability under
rule 10b-5, each would be free of the conflicting duties they possess
when considered as parts of a single entity. However, the potential
benefits of such a solution would be outweighed by the far more serious
problems the solution would pose to the structure of our financial
institutions and capital markets. For example, one of the most difficult problems to resolve in considering a complete spin-off of trust
activities is whether the resulting independent companies would have
sufficient capital accounts out of which potential surcharge claims could
be satisfied. 7 As of December 1974, commercial banks insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had a total of over $60 billion
of capital accounts.8 8 Although it is arguable whether such a large
amount of capital is necessary, this abundance of capital can assure a
degree of public confidence in financial institutions, even after a period
of substantial stock market decline. Additionally, in the absence of
84. Bank trust department activities are generally within the corporate structure
of a bank rather than within the structure of a bank holding company. Although
the term "spin-off" can refer to a movement of these activities from the bank to the
holding company, this article contemplates a complete separation of the functions,
including separate incorporation and capitalization. For further discussion of the
holding company spin-off concept, see D. GREEN & M. SCHUELKE, THE TRUST
ACTIVITIES OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY 18-21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as GREEN &
SCHUELKE] (study prepared for the Trustees of the Banking Research Fund Association of Reserve City Bankers).
85. STAFF REPORT FOR SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE CoMM.
ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR
TRUST ACTIVITIES:

EMERGING

INFLUENCE

ON

THE AMERICAN

ECONOMY

(Comm.

Print 1968).
86. Id. For a comprehensive analysis of the report, see AMERICAN BANKERS
ASSOCIATION, THE ECONOMIC POWER OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 1

(1970).

87. A surcharge claim is a suit for damages brought against a trustee for losses
to the beneficiaries caused by a breach of trust See BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,
supra note 54, § 862.
88. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BANK OPERATING STATISTICS
Table A (1974).
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protective legislation, spin-offs could lead to takeovers by non-financial
institutions which might be more prone to misuse the economic power
of trust assets.8 ' Finally, since as a matter of history only the largest
trust departments have been profitable,90 there would be pressure in
the industry to consolidate, thereby exacerbating the already extant
problems of concentration."
D.

Abstention

Another possible solution would require a bank to abstain from
trading in a particular corporation's securities when, due to a banking
relationship with a client, it is in a position to obtain material inside
information about that corporate customer. Assuming that the commercial and trust departments are considered as merely parts of a
particular entity, two questions must be resolved. First, would this
abstention violate the duty a bank trustee owes to its trust beneficiaries,
particularly if the information is determined later to be neither material
nor inside? Second, since a large bank is in a position to obtain
material inside information about many corporations, would this restriction prevent a trust department from trading in such a large
number of securities that it could no longer operate effectively?
89. The authors have observed that the Federal Reserve Board uses a guideline
that capital should be equal to twice a trust department's annual gross income. Therefore, a department with $4 billion in trust assets and $12 million in annual gross revenue
would require capitalization of only $24 million. In such a situation a non-bank entity
could acquire control over the investment of this $4 billion in trust assets at a cost
of only $12.2 million or 51% of the total required capital.
90. See Ehrlich, The Functionsand Investment Policies of PersonalTrust Departments - Part 11, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. MNLY. Rxv. 14 (Jan. 1973). See also
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FUNCTIONAL COST ANALYSIS 1974 AVERAGE BANKS 16.
Product mix is also responsible for varying degrees of profitability between different
trust departments. Product mix includes the range of various services that a particular trust department offers such as estates, personal trusts and investment advising.
It should be noted that it is primarily the larger commercial banks that offer the

more extensive range of fiduciary services. Ehrlich, supra, at 12.
91. The problem of concentration has been summarized as follows:
Bank trust departments are too big. Their total of $400 billion of assets administered puts too much of the private capital of the country - and, therefore, corporate control - in the hands of one kind of institution - banks. This is par-

ticularly true of the 250 banks that administer 89% of the trust assets.
Trust Separation from the Bank, 66 BANKING (Feb. 1974), at 26.
In response to the allegation of over-concentration, it has been stated:
Separation of the trust function from banks would not necessarily reduce the
amount of assets administered by trust companies. In fact, it might well increase
the concentration in few institutions, as smaller trust companies found it difficult
to attract capital and had to drop out of the business. Moreover, the concentration issue is a synthetic one, because banks do not alone make the investment
decisions involved in hundreds of billions of dollars of assets for which the banks
are custodians.
Id. at 27. For an analysis of the impact of institutional investing on corporations and

the capital markets, see C.

ELLIS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING

227-35 (1971).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

21: p. 367

From the standpoint of the beneficiary, abstention involves serious
problems since it would result in the beneficiary being bound to an
illiquid investment over a considerable length of time. For example,
if the commercial department was deeply involved with a troubled
corporation, it would have access to a stream of inside information
covering a period of months or years. Since most trust instruments
do not provide for an automatic or simple method of changing trustees,
the beneficiary would be burdened with an investment even though a
decision on purchase or sale could be reached independently of the
inside information. Furthermore, the bank trustee's abstention would
be based solely upon its desire to avoid liability under rule lOb-5 with
a resultant detriment to the trust beneficiary. It is arguable that such
a self-serving action should increase the trustee's liability to the beneficiary, particularly if the information was later determined not to be
92

material.

Brokerage firms, faced with similar inside information difficulties,
93
have periodically attempted to resolve their dilemma by abstention.
If the underwriting department of a firm is in negotiation with a
corporation, the retail department will not trade in or recommend that
corporation's securities. Often the abstention is internally effectuated
by the use of a restricted list which includes the names of all the
corporations with which the underwriting department is dealing. The
retail department will abstain from trading in the securities of the
corporations listed.
Abstention proves effective in the brokerage industry since most
underwriting is concluded in a relatively short period of time. The
retail customer does not permanently loose any liquidity since a transaction can always be executed with another firm. As applied to trust
departments and their beneficiaries, however, such a proposal could
prove disastrous. Large commercial banks maintain long-term, multiservice relationships with a wide number of corporations throughout
the country;94 with such a large customer base, it would not be practical to create a restricted list or to abstain from trading in the securities
of corporations where there is a substantial chance the commercial
department would obtain inside information. Not only would trust
department investment activity be limited, but stock prices would be
adversely affected if a trust department had a substantial amount of
money invested in a limited number of securities. Both of these conse92. See text accompanying notes 54 & 67-68 supra.
93. See Brief for Salomon Brothers as Amicus Curiae at 5, 13, Slade v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
94.

FORTUNE MARKET RESEARCH, BUSINESS & BANKING
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quences would obviously be detrimental to the interest of the trust
beneficiary.
E. The Chinese Wall
Commercial banks frequently attempt to resolve their dilemma
by creating a so-called "Chinese Wall" (Wall) between their commercial and trust departments. The Wall consists principally of policy
statements purporting to either restrict or eliminate the flow of information between these departments.9 5 In some cases the Wall also involves
a physical separation, although such a separation normally occurs
only in larger commercial banks.9" The Wall not only prohibits the
flow of material information, 'but in many cases eliminates the flow
of all information without regard to its materiality, thus ensuring
independent investment decisionmaking by the trust department.97 The
policy statements vary from bank to bank, but they generally restrict
the trust personnel's access to the commercial department's credit files.
Since most Wall policy statements do not refer to routine communications between departments, it can be inferred that such communications
are not restricted.9 8 In fact, many banks encourage coordinated communications in such areas as marketing and sales.9"
At first glance, the Wall appears to resolve two of the bank's
three conflicting duties. The trust department in a "walled" environment would not, theoretically, have access to material inside information upon which it could trade and would therefore not violate the
duty that it owes to the investing public to disclose or abstain from
95. E. HERMAN, supra note 46, at 76, 83-87.
96. A Wall is more difficult to create in a small bank because the bank personnel
may be in close physical proximity and may be assigned overlapping trust and banking
functions. Id. at 83.
97. Id. at 84.
98. The policy statement of one bank dictates:
3. No Trust Department action or investment decision such as the purchase or sale of a security, shall be made on information that could
reasonably be construed as "insider information." Employees who
possess such information are prohibited from taking independent action,
either on behalf of an account or for his personal benefit, until that
information is available to the market place generally. This is particularly true in the relationship between the Girard banking and trust
departments where inside information could be construed to have been
obtained through banking relationships. ...
4. Trust Department personnel shall not have access to the files of the
Bank's Credit Department and should advise their customers, when
possible, that they should not expect us to rely on any information
received through banking relationships when making investment recommendations for their account.
GIRARD BANK, TRUST DEPARTMENT POLICY HANDBOOK 7 (1975) (emphasis omitted).
99. E. HERMAN, supra note 46, at 79-80. See also GREEN & SCHUELKE, Supra
note 84, at 39.
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At the same time, ,the commercial department of the bank
trading.'
would not have cause to violate its duty to the corporate customer
not to disclose any confidential information. However, the Wall does
not completely resolve the duty that a trustee owes to the trust beneficiaries to seek and utilize all available information in making trust
investment decisions. As previously stated, a trustee has no duty to
violate the law.' However, it is uncertain whether this principle will
apply to banks because of a possible "higher" duty arising from a trust
relationship.' 0 2 The question would be further complicated by banks
who restrict all credit information regardless of its materiality, since
they are deliberately closing a source of valuable information merely
to protect themselves from liability under rule lOb-5. 0 3
Presently, there are two main problems with the use of a Wall
as a successful solution to the dilemma faced by commercial banks: its
present uncertain legal status and the difficulty in constructing an effective Wall.

1.

Legal Effect
The legal effect of a Wall is currently the subject of litigation in

the Second Circuit. In Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 0 4 the retail
salesmen of a brokerage firm had allegedly promoted the sale of common
stock to various customers without divulging to them material adverse
information possessed by the firm's investment banking department. 10 5
The purchasing customers brought an action against the brokerage
firm under rule 10b-5. In support of its motion for a summary judgment, the firm alleged, inter alia, that it had a Chinese Wall policy
which prevented the adverse information from being communicated to
the retail brokerage department.' 06 Rejecting this defense, the district
court denied the motion for summary judgment' 0 7 and certified'o" the
following question for review by the Second Circuit:
Is an investment banker/securities broker who receives adverse
material non-public information about an investment 'banking
100. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
101. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
104. 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974). For a comprehensive analysis of the Slade case,
see Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities

Firms, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 459, 478-87 (1975).
105. One of the disputed issues on appeal was whether the defendant had "solicited"
the purchase of securities or had "recommended" them, and whether this distinction
had any bearing on the defendant's liability. 517 F.2d at 402.
106. Id. at 401.
107. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
.SEc. L. REP. 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
108. Id. at [/94,439.
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client precluded from soliciting customers for the client's securities
on the basis of public information which (because of its possession
of inside information) it knows to be false or misleading?" 9
The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court, stating that the question could not be answered without certain factual
determinations, including whether an effective Chinese Wall existed
in the brokerage firm."' Hopefully, in requesting a determination of
whether a Wall existed, the Slade court was contemplating giving
judicial approval of a Wall, with a view to imposing liability only if
it could be proven that a trust department knowingly traded on the
basis of inside information. Such a judicial position is at present only
a matter for conjecture, and the legal effect to be given the Wall by
the judiciary will depend on the outcome of the Slade litigation."'
However, one immediate result which has brought comfort to the
banking community is the favorable position adopted by the SEC
in the Slade case with respect to the Chinese Wall." 2 The concern
of the banking industry with Slade is well-taken since both the Second
Circuit and the SEC have recognized that the considerations involved
in the case have an effect on the commercial department/trust department relationship of commercial banks. 13
Federal legislation and administrative regulation would facilitate
the successful implementation of the Chinese Wall as well as the utilization of any of the other alternative solutions. To the authors' knowledge, neither the federal agencies regulating commercial banks" 4 nor
the SEC has directly dealt with the dilemma. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency prepared a regulation which favored the estab109. 517 F.2d at 399.
110. Id. at 402-03.

111. One recent development favorable to the legal validity of a Wall is the decision
of the United States Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 44 U.S.L.W.
4451 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1976). In Hochfelder, the Court held that a private cause of action
for damages will not lie under rule 10b-5 in the absence of an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. Id. at 4460. While the issue of intent is distinct from the
issue of the legal effect to be given a Wall, Hochfelder, when read in conjunction
with the recent decision of the Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975), indicates a judicial trend to restrict the scope of liability under
rule lOb-5. See note 69 supra.
112. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
113. 517 F.2d at 400; see text accompanying note 118 infra.
114. There are three agencies primarily responsible for the federal regulation of
bank trust departments: 1) the Comptroller of the Currency, who is mainly responsible
for overseeing the trust departments of national banks, 2) the Federal Reserve System,
which examines its member banks, and 3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), which regulates state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve,
but which are insured by the FDIC. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra

note 86, at 56-59.
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lishment of a Wall, but it furnished few guidelines and the regulation
was ultimately abandoned." 5 The SEC has conducted studies on the
general problem of insider liability and disclosure, but not specifically
as it relates to bank trust departments."' However, as previously
mentioned, the SEC has recognized that the problem does exist in
the commercial banking industry,"' and has expressed the following concern:
[D]rastic consequences may flow from a rule which would preclude a brokerage firm from having any transactions with or on
behalf of customers in the securities of the perhaps numerous
companies with which it has investment banking relationships,
or from a comparable rule which would preclude a bank trust department from effecting transactions in the securities of companies8
with which the bank has a commercial banking relationship."
The present problem with federal administrative regulation is
that none of the federal agencies has the authority to formulate rules
which could resolve the entire dilemma of commercial banks. While
banks are subject to liability under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
they are for the most part otherwise exempt from the securities acts
and outside of the purview of the SEC." 9 On the other hand, the
bank regulators are inexperienced in the intricacies of the securities
markets and their regulation. Their authority is limited to the regulation of the banking industry, and traditionally they have been more
concerned with the safety of depositors' funds than with the interests
of the investing public.
Accordingly, some form of cooperation among the federal agencies is necessary. This cooperation may be forthcoming, at least to
115. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 9.7, 39 Fed. Reg. 14510 (1974). The amendment as
initially proposed contained a requirement that banks establish policies and procedures
to "ensure that investment decisions of the trust department [were] not based upon
non-public information." Id. The proposal was not adopted. 39 Fed. Reg. 28144 (1974).
116. See Hearings on "A Study of the Securities and Exchange Commission"
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 81,

635, 840 (1952).
117. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
118. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
119. Sections 3(a) (2) and 3(a) (5) of the 1933 Act exempt bank securities from
registration of their securities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(c) (a) (2), (5) (1970). Sections 3(a)(4)
and 3(a) (5) of the 1934 Act exclude banks from the definition of broker or dealer.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a) (4), (5) (1970). Sections 202(a) (3), 202(a) (7), and 202(a)(11)
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 exempt banks from the definition of a broker,
dealer, or investment adviser. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a) (3), (7), (11) (1970). Sections
3(c) (3) and 3(c)(11) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 exempt common
trust funds from the definition of an investment company. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c) (3),

(11)

(1970). This pattern of legislative exemption of banks has resulted in the SEC

having relatively little experience with banks or their activities.
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some degree, as under the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,12
the federal securities and banking regulators are now required to
work together in the areas of transfer agent registration, 121 institutional disclosure, 122 and municipal dealer registration.123 If the federal
agencies work cohesively in these areas, appropriate rules and regulations dealing with the dilemma of commercial banks are possible.
In the final analysis, congressional legislation may be the only
effective way to resolve the dilemma.124 Such legislation could recognize the validity of the Wall and place a prohibition on the flow of
information between the commercial and trust departments of a commercial bank. Ideally, the burden could be placed upon a potential
plaintiff to prove that the Wall had been pierced and that the trust
department had in fact acted upon the material inside information.
To resolve the predicament fully and without ambiguity, such legislation would also have to contain a provision overriding conflicting
state law and eliminating the duty of a trustee to gather all relevant
investment information in this situation.
2.

Constructing a Wall

In the absence of Congressional action, a self-imposed Wall
seems to be the only practical alternative to which commercial banks
can turn in order to reduce their potential liability. In terms of liability under rule 10b-5, the success of a Wall is ultimately dependent
upon its credibility; it is important that the Wall be perceived by the
public as effective and, more importantly, that a bank can demonstrate
such effectiveness in a rule lOb-5 proceeding.125 There appear to be
several factors which detract from the credibility of a Wall. For
example, a Wall does not prohibit common dining facilities where
commercial department and trust department officers may share lunch120. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a et seq. (Supp. 1975).
121. See id. § 78s(a) (2).
122. See id. § 78m(f) (1).
123. See id. § 78o-4(c) (6).
124. Congress has recently resolved one conflict between the areas of trust law and
federal securities regulation with the "paying up" provision of the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975. Id. § 78bb(e). "Paying up" refers to the payment of a brokerage
commission in an amount which exceeds the actual cost of executing the security
transaction, frequently used to compensate a broker for research services. Traditional
trust law would prohibit this, since it requires a trustee to execute a transaction at
the lowest possible price. Section 78bb(e) is an attempt to legalize the concept of
trustee utilization of part of the commission received from the trust as compensation
for research services. See generally S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-71 (1975).
125. The inherent credibility of the Wall has been openly questioned by a number
of commentators. See E. HFROMAN, supra note 46, at 77; Harfield, Texas Gulf Sulphur
and Bank Internal Procedures Between the Trust and Commercial Departments, 86
BANKING L.J. 869, 878 (1969) ; Yellon, supra note 47, at 412-14. See also note 58 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

21: p. 367

time conversations. A Wall cannot realistically prevent these informal
conversations and does not pretend to guarantee such a complete
blockage of information. Also, there will always be doubt whether in
a crisis situation an officer such as the bank president would not, or
more importantly could not, obtain and use all of the information held
by the bank.' 26 In short, unless a bank takes positive steps to ensure
compliance with the Wall policy, the Wall will be of questionable value.
Several steps may be taken to enhance the Wall's credibility.
Initially, in formulating their policy statements, banks should consider eliminating the flow of both material and nonmaterial information, since allowing a trust officer access to credit files for routine or
nonmaterial information presents several problems. First, bank officers
may not be in a position to determine what is material for rule lOb-5
purposes, and second, it is doubtful whether a court would consider
such a partial screen effective." 7 Banks might also consider notifying
their customers of their policies and stating clearly that trust customers
should not expect the trust department to use any information the
commercial department may possess. However, because of the possibility of unknown or unborn remaindermen involved with trusts, such.
a task could be formidable. To the degree it was possible, however,
this policy would reduce the number of potential plaintiffs. Additionally, banks should adopt a "two-way" rather than a "one-way" Wall.
The "one-way" concept would allow commercial officers to use trust
department files and only prohibit trust officers from utilizing commercial department files. While there seems to be no legal prohibition
to the "one-way" concept, it is damaging to the extent that it reduces.
the credibility of the Wall. Finally, trust officers and commercial
officers should not sit on common committees such as the trust department's investment policy or stock selection committee. Such a situation would obviously raise a question of whether a commercial officer
would influence the group 'based on material inside information. Furthermore, in every bank there is usually one member of senior management who has responsibility for both the banking and trust departments.
This officer should, to the extent possible, avoid involvement in the
day-to-day operations of either group.
Other procedures a commercial bank might consider in creating
a Wall include physical separation of the departments and a compliance program. Physical separation is receiving more attention in
recent years because many people feel that it serves as a concrete126. For an illustration of such a crisis, see Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations. Part 2: Leasco Data Processing Corp. Before the Antitrust Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 148, 532 (1969).
127. See note 58 supra.
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manifestation of the concept of complete trust department autonomy.
In some instances, physical separation is accompanied by a transfer
of all or part of the bank's investment management functions to its
holding company. Compliance programs are helpful if effective; however, most compliance programs are composed of policy statements or
rules of conduct which may be difficult to enforce.
A business practice detrimental to an effective Wall is the joint
calling and sales program conducted by most banks. These programs
-consist of banking officers introducing trust officers to their corporate
clients and vice versa, and are premised upon the belief that a longstanding banking relationship is a strong inducement to creating a
trust relationship. Bankers, for the most part, ,believe that these programs are essential in generating new business and serve the public
interest by fulfilling the needs of customers. In further support of the
joint calling and sales programs, bankers point to the fact that there
,exists little evidence of abuse in these areas. Nevertheless, these programs do represent a potential weakness in what might otherwise be
considered a credible Wall.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Banks have historically been proud of the working relationship
between their commercial and trust departments. In fact, for many
years trust departments have offered this relationship as a selling
point, contending that a trust department could make more informed
1 8
investment decisions because it had access to more information.
The growth of liability under rule lOb-5 and the disclosure dilemma
it has created for banks has obviously 'brought an end to this era. In
developing a solution to the dilemma currently faced by commercial
banks, two factors must be considered. First, to what extent is
change necessary? Second, what impact will any change have on the
-structure of our financial institutions?
In response to the first question, little damage has resulted from
the current operating structure of commercial banks. The dilemma
does not arise from the practical operations of commercial 'banks, but
rather from the extension of rule lOb-5 to situations not originally
•contemplated by the rule. 129 In such a case, it would seem appropriate
to cure only the technicality and not subject the system to major surgery.
The critical nature of the answer to the second question requires
128. For a discussion of the desire of corporate financial executives for full-service
banking, see Why Corporate Customers Like Banking's New Power, Bus. WEEK,
Sept. 15, 1973, at 150.
129. See 1 BROMBERG, supra note 16, §§ 2.2(410)-(420).
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a careful evaluation of each of the proposed solutions; only those with
the least amount of disruption to the capital markets should be adopted.
The solution offered by Professor Schuyler of immunity from
rule lOb-5 would have the least effect upon the present operating
structure of our financial institutions. However, this solution has
only a minimal chance of adoption since it runs directly counter to the
disclosure policy of rule lOb-5 as perceived by the courts and the SEC.
While the alternative of full disclosure would relieve the commercial
banks from liability under rule lOb-5, it would cause a severe disruption of the capital markets by destroying the confidential bankercorporate client relationship essential to the smooth operation of the
capital markets. A spin-off of the trust department from the other
departments of a commercial bank would create more problems than
it would solve in the nature of potential insufficient capitalization or
increased concentration. Abstention cannot be realistically adopted by
the banking industry since it would result in a distortion of stock market
prices and an undesirable illiquidity in the investment of ,trust assets.
In the final analysis, the most effective solution can only result
from a dedication of legislative and administrative resources to the
dilemma. However, since this seems unlikely at the present, commercial banks must protect themselves 'by the implementation of a Wall.
Conflicts of interest exist in every business. However, it is essential that these conflicts be recognized and resolved in a manner equitable
to all parties. Commercial banks have attempted to do this by erecting
the Wall and it remains for Congress and the courts to give recognition
and viability to its existence.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/1

26

